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Appellee's Statement of the Case
This case comes from the trial court on an appeal from a directed verdict. After the
parties closed their evidence on the issue of liability, the court heard and granted a motion
for directed verdict from the defense. Ms. Ottens had alleged that Dan McNeil was directly
and vicariously liable for causing an accident that occurred after a chair owned by Mr.
McNeil fell from a pick-up being driven by his son Jake. In her pleadings Ms. Ottens had
claimed that Dan had employed his son Jake, and that Dan had also improperly loaded and
or secured the chair.
As will be shown by citation to the record in the body of this brief, all of the evidence
presented at trial showed that on the day of the move Jake was employed by D&K Finish
Carpentry, Inc., (D&K), paid by D&K, and was engaged in moving D&K's office and
equipment from a residence in Bluffdale to Union Park. Some personal items belonging to
Dan McNeil were also being moved. There was also some equivocal testimony that Dan
McNeil had given Jake some money for gas.
After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court noted that the overwhelming
evidence showed that Jake was employed by D&K at the time of the accident. It also stated
that there had been no evidence that Dan had employed his son. The court therefore directed
a verdict in favor of the defense on vicarious liability.
A directed verdict was also granted on the direct negligence claims. There had been
no evidence presented at trial that Dan, rather than any one of the other 6 people on site,
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loaded the chair or secured it in Jake's vehicle. There was no evidence that he inspected the
vehicle before it left. All that Plaintiff was able to show was that Dan had helped tie some
ropes to the eye hooks on the pick up. The court found that there was no evidence to tie Dan
to the chair or to allege he inspected the vehicles. It also held that under Utah law, the driver
has the ultimate duty to inspect and ensure that a load is safely secured.
Ms. Ottens complained that the evidence of Jake's employment by D&K was an
improper affirmative defense, and moved after the close of evidence to name D&K as a
party, and to allege an action to pierce the corporate veil. The court denied the motion
because of its untimeliness, its high potential for prejudice, and because it violated
procedural due process.
Ms. Ottens has also sought review of the trial court's decision to deny her the
opportunity to amend her complaint to name Jake McNeil as a party. The court had declined
to permit the amendment because it was first proposed more than four years after the
accident, and therefore would have been subject to an immediate dismissal on the grounds
of the statute of limitations.
Finally, Ms. Ottens has sought review of certain evidentiary rulings made by the court.
In particular, Ms. Ottens complains that the trial court erred when it refused to admit the
investigative report, in an effort to show that Dan was the actual driver of the vehicle. The
court allowed Ms. Ottens to question Mr. McNeil on the matter, but held that Ms. Ottens'
complaint did not allege that Dan was the driver and this amounted to an effort to change the
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pleadings and theory of the case at the last minute. The court also found the document to be
of problematic origin, and internally inconsistent.
Appellee's Statement of Issues of Appeal
1. Did the court err in directing a verdict for Dan McNeil on the claim for respondeat
superior when all of the evidence showed that Jake McNeil was employed by, and engaged
in the work of, D&K when the accident occurred, and where there was no evidence that he
was employed or paid by Dan McNeil, as the plaintiff alleged in her complaint? Reviewed
under a correctness standard. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 49, f 19.
2. Did the court err in directing a verdict for Dan McNeil on the direct negligence
causes of action when there was no evidence to show that he placed, or attempted to secure,
the chair into Jake's truck, and where the evidence shows that Jake, aged 23, was the sole
driver of the vehicle, and where the evidence showed that Dan was under no duty to secure
the chair? Reviewed under a correctness standard. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT
49, If 19.
3. Did the trial court err when it declined to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her complaint
to add Jake McNeil as a party after the statute of limitations had run, when the facts show
that there was no identity of interest between Jake and his father Dan, and when there was
no evidence that Jake committed any wrongdoing sufficient to invoke equitable tolling?
Motions to Amend should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sulzen v.
Williams 977 P.2d 497 (Utah 1992).
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4. Did the trial court err when it declined to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her complaint
after the close of evidence to add D&K as a party to action, or to allege that there was an
alter-ego relationship between Dan McNeil and D&K, or that Dan McNeil was driving the
vehicle that dropped the chair on the highway? Motions to Amend should be reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Sulzen v. Williams 977 P.2d 497 (Utah 1992).
5. Did the court err when it allowed Mr. McNeil to introduce evidence that D&K
employed Jake? Did this constitute an affirmative defense that must be set out in the
pleadings under Rule 8 or Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure! Interpretation of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Pete v.
Youngblood2006 UT App 303. ^ 7, 141 P.3d 629.
6. Did the court err in denying Ms. Ottens request to enter the accident report into
evidence as a means of showing that Dan McNeil was the driver of the pick-up, although she
had not made that claim in the pleadings? This is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Daniels v Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66 ^f 58.
7. Did the court err in allowing counsel to inquire when Ms. Ottens first retained
counsel, when Ms. Ottens claimed she was unduly prejudiced by misinformation in the police
report? Evidentiary Rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Daniels v.
Gamma West Brachy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66 \ 58.
Statutes, Constitutional Provisions, Ordinances and Rules
See, Addendum 4.
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Summary of Appellee's Arguments
1. The trial court properly granted a directed verdict in this case. Ms. Ottens produced
no evidence to show that Jake McNeil, who was driving the vehicle that dropped the chair
at issue, was employed and paid by Dan McNeil as was alleged in the complaint. All
evidence showed that Jake was employed by, paid by, and carrying out duties for D&K.
Testimony that Jake may have received gas money and carried some items belonging to Dan
McNeil did not establish a direct employment relationship. The trial court was also correct
in directing the verdict on the claims for direct negligence. There was no evidence that Dan,
rather than any other of the six persons on site, loaded or secured the chair into Jake's truck.
The jury would have been required to speculate or assume to find negligence on the part of
Dan McNeil.
2. The trial court properly denied the motion to add Jake McNeil as a party. The
statute of limitations had run by the time the motion was made. Jake and Dan do not share
an identity of interest, and there was no evidence of wrongdoing that would allow equitable
tolling. The amendment would have been futile, and therefore the court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion.
3. The trial court properly denied the motions to amend to add D&K and to allege
that Dan McNeil was liable as the driver of the truck or under an alter ego theory. These
motions were not made until after the close of evidence. The motions were untimely, ex
prejudicial, and would have violated D&K's due process rights to procedural regularity.
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4. The trial court did not err when it allowed the introduction of evidence that Jake
McNeil was employed by and working for D&K when transporting the chair at issue in this
case. This information had been supplied to Ms. Ottens from the outset of the litigation.
Additionally, the evidence did not constitute an affirmative defense; it was not an avoidance,
but rather directly contradicted Ms. Ottens' allegations that Dan McNeil personally employed
and paid his son to transport personal goods from one residence to the other. Dan was under
no obligation to designate D&K under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as he
was not seeking to allocate fault to D&K. Dan had designated Jake McNeil from the outset
of the case.
5. The trial court did not err in declining to admit the investigative report into
evidence to show that Dan McNeil was driving the truck from which the chair fell. There was
inadequate foundation for the report, it was internally inconsistent, and it contained three
different types of handwriting. Ms, Ottens was not able to show that Mr. McNeil filled in
the report. Additionally, Ms. Ottens had amended her complaint during the course of
litigation and abandoned the claim that Dan was the driver of the vehicle in favor of a
respondent superior cause of action. This amendment was done after questioning the
investigating officer about the report. The report was not relevant to the case pleaded.
6. The court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Mr. McNeil to question Ms.
Ottens about when she retained counsel. The facts were in evidence through her medical
records. Additionally it was relevant to her claims of prejudice, and may have been relevant
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to show that counsel directed treatment. This may have been relevant to the reasonableness
of her treatment.
Argument
I) The trial court properly granted a directed verdict. Ms. Ottens produced no
evidence that would support her claim that Jake McNeil was employed by the
Defendant Dan McNeil. And she produced no evidence that would support imposing
a duty of due care on Dan McNeil or that would support a finding that he acted
negligently.
In her second amended complaint against Dan McNeil, Ms. Ottens identified two
potential grounds of liability. First, she alleged that he had employed and paid his son, Jake
McNeil, to transport his personal property, and was therefore vicariously liable for Jake's
negligence in allowing a chair to escape from the back of Jake's truck. Second, she asserted
that Dan breached his duty of due care by improperly loading and securing the chair in Jake's
vehicle, and was therefore liable for the injuries she suffered when the chair came loose on
the highway. (Record 429-434)
On the fourth day of trial, after Ms. Ottens' counsel acknowledged that his evidence
on the issues of liability had been fully presented, the court entertained a motion for a
directed verdict made by defense counsel. After lengthy argument, and close consultation of
the record, the motion was granted. (Record 1014 pp. 81-85) In doing so, the court stated
that there was overwhelming evidence that Jake McNeil had been employed by D&K, that
there was no evidence to support that Jake was employed by Dan McNeil; that there was no
evidence that Mr. Dan McNeil had undertaken any affirmative act that would have given rise
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to a duty requiring him to ensure that the load placed in Jake's truck was secure, and that
there was no evidence that Dan McNeil was responsible for loading the chair at issue in this
case. (Record 984-985, 1014 pp. 81-85,)
A directed verdict is proper if "after examining all evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the
nonmoving party's favor." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 49, ^f 19 (quoting Daines
v. Vincent 2008 UT 51, f 20, 190 P.3d 1269.) When applying that standard, it is also
essential to recognize that if a jury would be required to base its decision about the presence
or absence of an essential element of a claim on mere speculation or conjecture, the trial
court should direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Walker v. Parish Chemical Company,
914 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Utah. App. 1996).
As will be shown more completely below, when the factual record in this case is
carefully scrutinized, and the standards set out in Ferguson and Walker are applied to those
facts, it becomes readily apparent that the trial court correctly granted the defendant's
motion. There is no competent evidence that Jake McNeil was working for his father on the
day the accident underlying this case occurred. Accordingly, there was no basis for to allow
the question of vicarious liability to go to the jury. Additionally, there was no evidence that
Dan McNeil was the individual who loaded the chair into Jake's pick-up, or that the chair
came loose from the vehicle as a result of Dan's actions or omissions.
Based on these facts, the court properly concluded that Ms. Ottens failed to produce
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sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury, as she failed to establish that Mr. McNeil
owed her a duty of due care or that he breached any duty he could have voluntarily undertake
in any way1. Since two essential elements of a cause of action for negligence were missing,
the directed verdict was appropriate.
1.) There was no evidence presented at trial that would support a finding that
Jake McNeil was employed by his father, Dan McNeil, The court properly directed a
verdict on the claim for vicarious liability.
One of Ms. Ottens' primary bases for asserting that Dan McNeil is responsible for the
injuries she allegedly suffered is that on the day and time in question, Jake McNeil was
working for, and being paid by, Dan McNeil to help move his personal property from his
former rental home in Bluffdale, Utah. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint ^f 14 (Record
431 -432.) Thus, according to the appellant, Mr. McNeil was vicariously liable for the actions
of his son. (Record 431-432.) At the time of trial, however, there were simply no facts
elicited from the witnesses that supported this allegation. All of the testimony showed that
Jake was employed by D&K, a company owned by his father and stepmother, that he was
being paid by D&K on the day of the move, that other D&K employees were on site helping,
and that the items moved on that day largely belonged to D&K, and were used in the
business. In short, all of the evidence pointed to the conclusion that Jake was employed by

1

To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four essential
elements: (1) that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that
duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4)
that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages. Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins.
Exchange, 2008 UT App 315,ffif28-29, 193 P.3d 650,
9

D&K at the time of the move, and that the move itself was a corporate activity. A careful
review of the testimony unambiguously proves this point.
When Ms. Ottens called Jake McNeil to the stand, her very first questions were
whether Jake was related to Dan McNeil, and whether he had ever worked for him. (Record
1010 p.3:13-16) The response was unequivocal; Jake testified that he had been employed by
D&K. (Record 1010 p.3:17) Upon further examination by Ms. Ottens' counsel he stated
that he received payroll from D&K (Record 1010 p. 4:24), that he was a finish carpenter by
trade (Record 1010 p.5:14), and that at the time of the accident D&K would obtain work and
he and other employees would go out and do the jobs it obtained. (Record 1010 p.5:22-23)
He also testified that maintenance and gas for the truck he used in the business, which he was
purchasing, was occasionally subsidized by D&K. (Record 1010 p.7:1-4.)
More importantly, all of the testimony elicited from Jake by Ms. Ottens shows that
on the day of the accident, three or four employees of D&K, including Jake, were moving
the company's office and carpentry equipment2 from one local ion to another. (Record 1010
pp. 10:16-21, 25:1-2) The property included filing cabinets, boxes, a large wooden desk,
shapers, chop saws, table saws and other carpentry equipment. (Record 1010 pp. 5:25, 6:1,
8:16-20,22:23-25,23:1-5). Furthermore, Jake testified that he and the other employees who
were involved in the move were paid by D&K, as part of their ordinary wages. (Record 1010

2

A table and chairs belonging to Dan McNeil were also put in Jake's truck. It was
one of those chairs that came loose.
10

p.l9:l-12)
Dan McNeil confirmed his son's recollection. He testified that the vast majority of
items being moved on that day belonged to, and were used in, the business he owned with
his ex-wife. As Jake had done, Dan identified the work tools as a large part of the move, but
also testified that there were three filing cabinets, a desk, a computer, a copy machine, a fax
machine, a printer, rolls of pending projects, and office chairs being transported on that day.
(Record 1012 p.37:15-25,38:4-12) And, while Dan acknowledged that some personal items
were also taken, he explained that he and Kim3 had actually been divorced since 1998, and
that he had moved most of his personal items out of the home when that became final.
(Record 1012 p. 36:8-15) He had, however, kept his office in his former home. (Record
1012 p. 37:1)
In sum, the evidence elicited at trial was as follows: (1) On the day of the move Jake
was employed and paid by D&K Finish Carpentry; (2) Jake and other company employees,
were carrying out a corporate activity in moving D&K's business and office equipment from
one location to the other, and (3) While some of Dan's personal belongings may have been
moved4, the primary purpose of the activity was to move the property necessary to carry on
the business of D&K. Ms. Ottens' assertion that including one or two personal items in the
move changes it into a personal errand, and thereby makes Jake Dan's employee, rather than

3
4

Kim McNeil was the K of D&K.
The only items specifically identified were a kitchen table and chairs.
11

D&K's, simply does not stand up to scrutiny5. Indeed, Ms. Ottens' characterization of this
as a hasty move necessitated by a divorce, with the implication that it was therefore primarily
personal in nature, is belied by the facts. The personal part of the move had long been
completed. The business purpose remained.
Since all evidence pointed to the fact that Jake was employed by D&K, and not by
Dan personally, and that Jake was fulfilling a corporate purpose at the time of the accident,
the trial court was correct in directing a verdict on the claim of vicarious liability.
(ii.) The fact that Jake was moving a table and chair belonging to Dan McNeil would
not support a claim of vicarious liability.
Briefly, it is important to note that in addition to the voluminous evidence relating to
D&K's employment of Jake, the court also paused to point out that Ms. Ottens had simply
failed to produce any evidence that Dan had employed Jake or that an agency relationship
existed between the two. (Record 1014 p. 19:13-18.) As the court noted, the only evidence
relating to the claim that Dan personally employed Jake is that Dan stated that he may have
given Jake some gas money for the move6. It also noted that it may be fair to assume that

5

The court noted that the litigated and tested evidence construed most favorably
to Ms. Ottens' position would be that Jake was paid by the corporation in the ordinary
course of business and was doing things for the corporation when the move occurred, and
incidentally helping out his father at the same time. (Record 1014 p. 22:3-7).
6

The precise testimony was that during his deposition, Mr. McNeil stated that he did not
recall paying anyone for the move, but he may have given them gas money. (Addendum 2 p.
9:13). When asked about Jake's deposition testimony that he received his regular paycheck, Mr.
McNeil stated that he would trust Jake's memory over his own, and that Jake was probably more
accurate. (Addendum 2 p. 35:1-17; see also, Record 1012 p.9:15-19, where Mr. McNeil testified
that he told Ms. Ottens' counsel that he gave Jake gas money.)
12

Jake may have been doing Dan a favor in moving some of his personal items along with the
D&K property. (Rec. 1014 19:16-18).
Frankly, under established Utah law this type of activity would not be sufficient to
establish an employment or agency relationship. This state has long rejected the family
purpose doctrine, Conklin v. Walsh 193 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1948), and therefore the mere
fact that Jake was helping his father move some personal items would not be sufficient to
establish an employment or agency relationship. Indeed in one of the earliest Utah cases to
discuss the parameters of vicarious liability for the operation of a motor vehicle, the Utah
Supreme Court made clear that where family relationships are concerned, agency (and
therefore vicarious liability) cannot be established by looking at the ultimate purpose or
object of the trip. Rather, the court stated, the question that must be answered is whether the
purported principal had the right to control the agent during the trip. Fox v. Lavender 56
P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah 1936). If not, then there was no agency in the operation of the
vehicle, and vicarious liability would not be present.
The example provided by the court to illustrate this point is telling, especially in light
of the facts present here. Justice Wolf pointed out that a husband may take his own car and
do a favor for his wife, such as picking up a dress from the cleaners, and would be in a sense
his wife's agent to procure the dress. But, unless the wife exerted control over her husband's
operation of the vehicle, he would not be her agent for the operation of the automobile, and
not vicariously liable for any accident. The court then noted that this would be so, even if the
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defendant had given the person a little cash to get the dress. Id. 1052. Here, all of the
evidence shows that Jake was driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident (Rec. 1010
p. 6:20-22), and that he was fully in control of that vehicle, and operating without instruction
or supervision from Dan.(Rec. 1010 pp.25-29) Thus, even if the overwhelming evidence
about his employment by D&K is simply ignored, under the analysis contained in Fox v.
Lavender there is still no evidence that Jake was employed by or acting as the agent of Dan
McNeil.

The trial court rightfully rioted the absence of evidence to show

employment/agency, and therefore properly dismissed the claim for vicarious liability.
2.) The trial court properly found that there was no evidence to support a finding
that Dan McNeil owed a duty to ensure that the chair at issue in this case was properly
secured.
When granting the directed verdict on the issue of direct negligence, the trial court
also looked at the question of whether Dan McNeil had a duty to ensure that Jake's vehicle
was properly loaded and secured before Jake left the Bluffdale property. This question is
essential, because without a duty a party may not be held negligent as a matter of law. See,
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 2008 UT App 315,ffif28-29, 193 P.3d 650,
in which the Court of Appeals noted that establishing the existence of a duty is the first
element in establishing a negligence claim. In this case, the trial court noted that based on
existing law, and based on the facts developed as the case was tried, it could not find that
Dan McNeil was under any legal obligation to ensure that Jake's vehicle was appropriately
secured before leaving the property. (Rec. 1014 pp. 81-85) It did so by making reference
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both to the statutory obligations imposed upon drivers of vehicles, and by looking at the facts
that were specific to the case.
Utah Code Ann., 72-7-409(6) states:
"A person many not operate a vehicle with a load on any highway unless the load
and any load covering is fastened, secured, and confined to prevent the covering
or load from becoming loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to the safe
operation of the vehicle, or to other highway users."
This statute is essential to the proper resolution of this case, because it clearly indicates that
our legislature, after due consideration, determined that it was the operator of the vehicle who
has the duty to ensure that any load contained in the vehicle is properly confined and tied
down. This makes sense, because it is, after all, the operator who must make the final
decision about whether to move the vehicle onto a roadway, and it is his or her sole
obligation to make decisions about the safety of the vehicle before he enters the roadway.
A recent case out of Appellate Court of the State of Washington shows why duties
such as this may not properly be delegated to others. In Ganno v. Langano Corporation, 80
P.3d 180, 184 119 Wash. App. 310, (Wash.App. 2d 2004), the court was confronted with a
claim that a lumberyard had failed to properly secure an I beam in the rear of the plaintiffs
pickup. When the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the beam coming loose from its
moorings, he alleged that this was evidence of fault on the part of the lumberyard. The Court
disagreed, pointing out that the Washington statute, which was very similar to ours7, made

7

The Court noted that RCW 46.61.655(1) stated that "No vehicle could be driven
or moved on any public highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to
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the driver ultimately responsible for ensuring the security of his vehicle. Id., 184. Thus, even
if the lumberyard had undertaken to secure the load, it could not be negligent, as a matter
of law, because it was the driver who "drove the truck on a public highway without first
ascertaining that his load would not escape." Id, 184.

While this is a case of first

impression in Utah, the statutory schemes are very similar, and the reasoning is sound. It is
the driver who determines to take the vehicle onto the roadway, and it is driver's ultimate
responsibility to make sure the load is secure before making that decision. To allow blame
to be shifted to someone other than the drive would allow operators to skirt responsibility for
an activity fully under their control, i.e., a final inspection of the vehicle before leaving.
It is necessary to recognize that the trial court also found that there was no evidence
that Dan had voluntarily undertaken any efforts to supervise the loading of the vehicle or to
secure the chair at issue, which, in its opinion, could potentially give rise to a duty. (Rec.
986, 1014 p. 73:20-23.) And this finding was clearly supported by the record. Both Dan and
Jake testified that for most of the day in question, Dan remained in the home, deciding what
should be taken away. (Rec. 1010 p. 24:8-14. 1012 p. 8:23-25) Dan further testified that he
did not inspect any of the vehicles before they left (Rec. 1012 p.9:4), and Jake stated that
when he decided to drive away his father was in the house with his ex-wife Kim. (Rec. 1010
p. 24:7).

prevent any of its load from dropping shifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping therefrom."
Id, 184.
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In granting a directed verdict, and finding that Dan McNeil was under no duty of care,
the court took note of all of this evidence, and compared it with what Ms. Ottens' offered
as proof of an affirmative act on Dan's part. She was able to point to only a single bit of
testimony, indicating that while Mr. McNeil did not inspect the loads to see if they were
secure, he had participated in "throwing some ropes" back and forth across two of the trucks.
(Rec. 1012 p. 9:14-14) Clearly, this one act would not support the existence of a duty,
because the testimony itself is so vague, and there was no follow-up. There is no indication
when the event occurred, what stage the packing was in, what had gone on before, or what
went on after. Similarly, there is no mention of attempting to secure the chair that came
loose. Simply stated, there were no facts that were sufficient to show that Dan had
undertaken any acts that would give rise to a duty that did not exist otherwise. The trial court
made the proper decision to direct the verdict because there was no duty of due care owed
by Mr. McNeil.
3.) There was no evidence that Dan McNeil improperly loaded or secured the
chair at issue.
Finally, Ms. Ottens argues that the recent case of Magana v. Dave Roth Construction,
2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143 has created new law that should cause this court to reassess Mr.
McNeil's liability for the injuries she suffered. A closer look at Magana, however, shows
that the case is both legally and factually inapposite to the facts presented at trial.
First, this court should note that Magana was primarily concerned with the application
and limits of the "retained control doctrine", a general rule that recognizes that "one who
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hires an independent contractor and does not participate or control the manner in which the
... work is performed owes no duty of care ...." Id, % 22. Here, the defendant did not assert
that Jake or the other D&K employees were independent contractors; rather, he asserted that
they were employed by someone other than him (personally). Thus, the entire discussion of
retained control is irrelevant.
Second, the fact that the Supreme Court found that a general contractor may still have
some liability for negligence, if he actively participated in the acts that caused the injury
complained of, does not break new grounds. As will be discussed in greater detail below,
Utah law has always held that an individual acting for or on behalf of a corporate entity may
be held liable for his own acts of negligence. See, Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v.
Harrison 2003 UT 14,ffif19, 21, 70 P.3d 35.
Third, and most important, however, a careful review of the Magana decision shows
why Mr. McNeil may not be held liable under the facts disclosed during trial. In Magana the
case for direct liability - as opposed to vicarious liability that is immunized by the retained
control doctrine - was based upon the fact that the defendant participated in the very act that
caused Mr. Magana injury. As the case makes clear, liability was not predicated on the
general obligation to oversee and supervise the safety of the job site, instead it was predicated
on the fact that the defendant's foreman was seen actively involved in securing the very load
of trusses that came loose and caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries. Id., f 37.
This, of course, is very different from what occurred in this case. Here, unlike the
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facts in Magana, no one was able to say who loaded the chair at issue (Rec. 1010 p.10:1620), and Jake identified at least six people that were involved in the process. (Rec. 1010 p.
10:16-18). Similarly, there was no testimony about who individually secured the vehicle's
load or looked over the contents. (Rec. 1010 p.23:23-25), though when Jake left the
Bluffdale property Dan was inside the home. (Rec. 1010 p.24:7) The only testimony related
to Dan was that he loaded some unspecified items and helped secure some ropes to the pickup. (Rec. 1012 p. 9:14-14) Thus, in order for a jury to have found Dan liable under a theory
of direct negligence, it would first have had to determine that Dan loaded the chair into
Jake's truck or that Dan undertook to secure the chair, and failed to do so. In the absence of
evidence, the jury would have been required to either assume or speculate that this was the
case. As set out above, this is impermissible. Walker v. Parish Chemical Company, 914 P.2d
1157, 1163 (Utah. App. 1996). The trial court was correct in directing the verdict.
II) The trial court properly denied the motion to amend the complaint to add
Jake McNeil as a party to this lawsuit. The statute of limitations had run by the time
that the motion was made. Jake had no identity of interest with Dan, and therefore the
amendment would have been futile.
Motions to amend pleadings are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The straightforward language of the rule states that a party must seek leave of
the court to amend its complaint once a responsive pleading has been filed, and that the court
should grant such requests liberally as justice requires. As set out in the motions and

8

Jake suspected that it was him or one of the other employees, because they were
the "young strong muscle." (Rec. 1010 p. 11:2)
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memoranda that were filed in the underlying case, however, there are limits to a trial court's
liberality. And it is an undisputed axiom of law that justice does not require that a court grant
a request to amend, if the new pleading is legally insufficient or futile. Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 139, 82 P.3d 1076. Futility, in turn, has been defined to
include those proposed pleadings that would be unable to withstand an immediate motion to
dismiss. Id., f 139.
This is precisely the case here. Ms. Ottens' proposed amended complaint, which was
filed on September 5, 2006, acknowledged that the accident at issue occurred on March 29,
2002. (Rec. 109-114). Thus, by the time she asked the court for permission to add Jake
McNeil as a party, the four-year statute of limitation had already run. Utah Code Ann., §7812-25 (currently renumbered as §78B-2-307). This would have made the amended complaint
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App 274 %6, 98 P.3d 429.
Ms. Ottens herself acknowledged this difficulty in the motion and memoranda that she
filed with the court. In those papers she recognized that unless she could provide a reason
to ignore the statute of limitations, her attempt to add Jake McNeil would be untimely and,
therefore, futile. In an effort to meet this challenge Ms. Ottens offered two potential grounds
to excuse the late filing. First, she argued that under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure the proposed amendment should relate back in time to the filing of the original
complaint, because Dan and Jake McNeil shared an identity of interest. (Rec. 120-121)
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Second, she asserted that because she was unaware that Jake was the driver of the vehicle,
the discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations. (Rec. 121 -122) As will be
illustrated below, neither of these provides an adequate basis for ignoring the statute of
limitations. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying the motion to amend to add
Jake McNeil as a party, because such an amendment would be futile under the facts of this
case.
1. Jake and Dan did not share an identity of interest as defined by this Court
because they did not share the same position or defenses in the litigation.
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure holds that when a claim asserted in
an amended pleading arises out of the same transaction or course of events described in the
original complaint, the amendment will relate back to the date of the original pleading. This
rule also allows a party to cure defects in her pleadings despite the intervening running of an
applicable statute of limitations. Russell v. Standard Corp. 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995).
However, it is well established that Rule 15(c) does not generally apply in cases in which the
plaintiff seeks to add a new party to the suit, as this would completely undermine the purpose
of statutes of limitation. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah
1984).
Naturally, the general rule has a narrow exception. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that
the party to be added has an identity of interest with a previously named party, such that it
can be assumed or proved that there would be no prejudice, then the amendment will relate
back to the time the complaint was originally filed. Penrose v. Ross 2003 UT App 157 ^f 9,
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71P.3d631.
The initial question that must be confronted, then, is what does it mean to have an
"identity of interest?" In Penrose this court answered the inquiry by holding that in the
context of Rule 15(c) a "true identity of interest" requires that the parties have the "same"
interests or posture toward the pending claim; i.e., the legal positions and defenses of the new
and old parties must be the same. Id., Tflf 15-17.
In showing how this standard should be applied, this Court engaged in an extended
discussion of Nunez v. Albo 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, a case it had considered just before
taking on Penrose. In Nunez the plaintiff sought to add the defendant's employer to the
pending suit, after the statute of limitations had expired, and argued that under the unique
circumstances of the case the two parties had the necessary identity of interest. It noted, for
example, that the new party acknowledged the employee-employer relationship, that it
admitted that the employee had been working within the course and scope of his
employment, and that the employer had provided a defense for the employee from the outset
of the case. Id., W 29-30. Thus, the disposition of the case against one party would
necessarily affect the liability of the other, demonstrating that the existence of a true identity.
Penrose at ^f 19. In contrast, the defendants in Penrose, a father and son, were determined
not to have the requisite identity of interest. In reaching this decision, this court focused on
the fact the defenses offered by the two were not congruent. The father's defense was simply
that he was not the driver of the vehicle in question, and therefore was not responsible for
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injuries resulting from its negligent operation. The son, however, was prepared to focus on
the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, unlike the Nunez defendants, the father and
son did not have the same posture toward the plaintiffs claims, did not share defenses, and
the disposition against one would not necessarily affect the disposition against the other. Id.,
f 19. Accordingly, there was no identity of interest.
Here, the underlying facts are more similar (indeed they are almost identical) to those
in the Penrose case than they are to the facts in Nunez. As set out in the briefing that was
filed in connection with the motion to amend, Dan McNeil's defenses to the allegations were
that he was neither the driver of the vehicle at issue in the case, nor the employer of his son.
(Rec. 65-74, and 124-136) Thus, he claimed that he had no direct or vicarious liability. For
this reason an allocation of fault under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
included in the answer.(Rec.65-74) In contrast, Jake's defense, like that of the son in
Penrose, would have focused on the fact that the statutory period had run. Additionally, had
the amendment been allowed, counsel for each of the two defendants would have been
obligated to explore who loaded the chair onto the truck, and who attempted to secure it.
Clearly, then, there was the potential for each party to point to the other as the culprit in
causing the injuries complained of by Ms. Ottens9. Under Penrose there is no identity of
interest in such circumstances.

9

This does not necessarily mean that the parties would not have shared some
common postures or defenses. It does show, however, that they did not have a completely
unified stance or approach to the pending litigation.
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Without the identity of interest10, the complaint against Jake would not relate back to
the time the initial complaint was filed. Since the proposed amendment would have been
filed more than five months after the statute of limitations had run, it would have been
subject to an immediate motion to dismiss. And, as set out above, justice does not require
that a trial court permit an amendment, when the pleading would be legally futile. The trial
court, therefore, made the appropriate decision in denying the motion to amend, and in no
way abused its discretion.
2. The equitable discovery rule does not apply in this case. It would have been
improper to add Jake McNeil as a party after the limitations period had run.
Much of Ms. Ottens' argument regarding the propriety of the court's decision to deny
her request to add Jake McNeil to the suit after the limitations period had run centers on the
claim that she was deceived or mislead by acts undertaken by Dan McNeil. Ms. Ottens
asserts that absent that impropriety she would have been able to name Jake to the suit in a
timely manner, and that the limitations period should be tolled under general principals of

10

Ms. Ottens makes a brief, and unconvincing, stab at asserting that this case
could be analyzed as a misnomer case, which allows a party 1o correct technical defects in
the pleadings. Penrose If 14. A misnomer occurs when a party misstates the name of a
defendant, for example identifying a defendant as "Geneva Rock Co.," instead of
"Geneva Rock Products". See, Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370-71
(Utah 1986). It can also occur when the proper party is identified in the body of the
complaint, but misidentified in the caption. Sidzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, ^f 14,
977 P.2d 497. Here there was no technical mistake. Ms. Ottens was not trying to
substitute Jake for Dan, and thereby correct a mistake in her pleadings. She was trying to
keep Dan in the suit, and add Jake. In Penrose, TJ 14 this Court stated that this was not a
type of misnomer.
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equity. This argument falters on two grounds. First, while the appellant has been quick to
assume that Mr. McNeil committed some malfeasance, the evidence does not support that
claim1 \ Second, the elements of equitable estoppel, which underlie the equitable discovery
rule, are simply not present in this case. Accordingly, there was no reason to apply the rule
in this case, and no reason to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court correctly declined
to allow an amendment under those circumstances.
(I.) The appellant has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Dan McNeil mislead her in any
way or that he was responsible for the contents of the police report and its addenda.
In assessing whether Ms. Ottens is entitled to invoke the equitable discovery rule, it
is essential to understand that her claim is based almost entirely on the assumption that it was
Mr. McNeil who filled out the Utah Highway Patrol Accident Information Form, which
identified him, rather than Jake, as the driver of the Ford pick-up involved in this action.
(Rec. 151-157) This, she claimed, was an affirmative misrepresentation on the defendant's
part that caused her to pursue the wrong individual in the first instance. (Rec. 131-149) The
record, however, does not bear out this contention. In fact, testimony given during the
discovery process and at trial strongly contradicts the accuracy of Ms. Ottens' basic
assumption.
During the discovery period, Ms. Ottens deposed the investigating officer, Trooper

11

Nor does the evidence support the contention that she acted with reasonable
diligence in moving her claim forward.
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Lee, and asked about how he came to name Dan McNeil in the report. The questioning
revealed that the officer did not know who had filled in the accident form, including the
information identifying D&K Finish Carpentry and Dan McNeil. (Addendum 3, p. 15). He
also testified that to the best of his recollection he got Mr. McNeil's name from a license
plate (Addendum 3, p. 18), and that he could not remember whether he ever spoke with Mr.
McNeil directly (Addendum 3, p. 18) Trooper Lee specifically stated that he did not know
if Dan McNeil had filled in the information (Addendum 3, p. 19) or if, in fact, he had a phone
conversation with Mr. McNeil himself. (Addendum 3, p. 28). Clearly, the investigating
officer's testimony calls into doubt the reliability of the document relied upon by Ms. Ottens
to establish "malfeasance" on the part of Mr. McNeil, and does nothing to show that Mr.
McNeil made any misrepresentation. In fact, we have no information how the report was
compiled.
The testimony given at trial also undermines the assumption that Mr. McNeil told
Trooper Lee that he was the driver of the vehicle. Counsel for Ms. Ottens aggressively
questioned Mr. McNeil about the police report, but was unable to establish that the writing
in the document was his. Under examination, Dan McNeil noted that there were at least
three different types of handwriting in the report (Rec. 1012 p. 17:21-23), and that while
some of them were similar to his own (Rec. 1012 p. 16:2, 17:4-6; 18:3-23) others were not
(Rec. 1012p. 17:18-20,18:9-15). More significant, however, is the testimony that he did not
recall filling out the form at issue, that he did not believe he had filled out the form, and that
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he "definitely did not fill out that I was the driver of the vehicle." (Rec. 1012 p. 21:21-25,
22:1.)

Based on this evidence only one conclusion can be drawn. Ms. Ottens' assumption
that Dan McNeil made a misrepresentation about who was driving the vehicle in question is
not supported by any competent evidence.
3. Jake McNeil cannot be made liable for the purported acts of Dan McNeil. The
equitable tolling may not be applied to bring Jake into the lawsuit after the limitations
period expired.
Even if this court were to give credence to Ms. Ottens' unfounded speculation
regarding the source of the misinformation contained on the official accident report, the
equitable discovery rule would still not apply to allow an amendment in this case. As set out
above, the exception created in Russell Packard Development v. Carson 2005 UT 14 f 26,
108 P.3d 741 is based upon principals of equitable estoppel, which are designed to keep a
party who has committed some malfeasance or wrongdoing from benefitting from that
impropriety. With respect to a statute of limitations, our Supreme Court held that "a
defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is estopped from relying on that
statute of limitations as a defense to the action." Id ^26.
Here, there is a very basic reason why this limited exception would not allow Ms.
Ottens to amend her complaint and add Jake as a party after the limitations period had
expired. Simply put, the appellant did not allege or prove that Jake played any part in
providing inaccurate information to the investigating officer (or to the appellant); indeed
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there is not a single fact anywhere in the record that even hints at such an occurrence. And
it would be improper to attribute the purported acts of his father to the son. Because he did
not cause any delay in bringing the action against himself, Jake was, and is, fully entitled to
take refuge in the defense provided by the statute of limitations. Estoppel is inappropriate.
4. Equity does not require that the discovery rule apply in this case.
Finally, and briefly, this Court should also recognize that principles of equity, as
applied to the facts in this case, do not compel the conclusion that Ms. Ottens should have
been permitted to amend her complaint to add Jake McNeil. And they most certainly do not
show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request.
Ms. Ottens hired counsel to pursue recovery for the injuries she allegedly suffered in
the underlying car accident within months of the accident. (Rec. 101 lpl39:9~l 1) She came
to a swift settlement with Ms. Cindy Quast, the driver who actually collided with the vehicle
that hit Ms. Ottens' truck. (Rec. 101 lp. 137:1-7) After this she simply waited for a number
of years, and then approximately three years later she finally filed suit against Mr. McNeil
and Mr. Coleman. (Rec. 1-7).
It is also worth noting that before the statute of limitations had expired, Dan McNeil
put Ms. Ottens on notice that Jake McNeil was the driver of the pick identified in the police
report. The defendant answered his complaint within days of his counsel accepting service,
and in that answer he stated that Jake was the likely driver of the Ford pick-up. (Rec. 63-64,
65-74) While the appellant complains that this designation was somewhat equivocal, Mr.
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McNeil did his best to provide information about an event that occurred almost four years
earlier. The uncertainly arose because Mr. McNeil was unsure whether Jake or another
individual was driving when the truck left his former residence. Both Dan and Jake testified
that on the day of the move, Dan was primarily inside the home supervising the loading of
boxes, and was not present when Jake departed. (Rec. 110:24:8-14, 1012 8:23-25) At any
rate, while there were only a few days before the statute ran, Ms. Ottens was aware of two
important facts. First, she knew that Dan was not the operator of the Ford pick-up. Second,
she knew the name of the likely driver. Yet, armed with these facts, she did nothing. A
motion to amend was not made for more than five months. (Rec. 115-116) Clearly, this is
not a timely and prompt response, and it need not be rewarded.
Finally, it is important to understand that the other issues raised by Ms. Ottens as
evidence to justify her inaction are without merit. She complains that Mr. McNeil's insurer
delayed in accepting service, but she fails to disclose that the delay was created in part by her
own actions. When defense counsel became aware that Mr. McNeil's insurer did not know
his location, it recognized that acceptance of service, which had been authorized by the
insurer, could potentially compromise Mr. McNeil's rights. Counsel offered to accept service
even though it did not know the whereabouts of Mr. McNeil, if Ms. Ottens would agree to
cap any recovery to the limits of insurance. When that offer was turned down, however,
there was no choice but to decline to accept12 service. (All of these facts are disclosed in
12

The discussions were conducted in a two week period after a copy of the
complaint and acceptance was forwarded to defense counsel. (Rec.228,230).
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correspondence attached to Appellants papers moving to amend. Rec. 228-230). Efforts
were made to skip trace Mr. McNeil, however, and when they proved successful,
arrangements were then made to accept service, and an answer was filed before the
expiration of the twenty days. (Rec.230, 65-74). Thus, rather than showing delay, the facts
reveal that Mr. McNeil acted with reasonable promptness, and disclosed the essential facts
of the underlying accident in time for Ms. Ottens to name Jake as a defendant to the action.
Her failure to do so should rest at her own feet.
Ill) The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to
amend its complaint to allege a cause of action against D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc.,
The motion to bring a new party into the case was made after the close of appellant's
evidence on liability.
On December 17, 2008, after acknowledging to the court that he had finished
presenting his evidence on liability13, appellant's counsel moved to amend its complaint to
add D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc., ("D&K") as a party to the action, and to set out a cause of
action alleging that D&K was an alter-ego of Mr. McNeil, thereby allowing it to pierce the
corporate veil. (Rec, 1013. 17:16-22, pp. 28:12-25,29:1-13). After hearing argument on the
matter the following morning, the court declined to allow such an amendment, noting that
the motion was untimely and posed a significant danger of prejudice to both Dan McNeil and
13

During a discussion that began with questions about jury instructions, the court
stated that it anticipated motions to dismiss based on the evidence presented, and asked
counsel if he had finished presenting evidence on the issue of liability. The parties
stipulated that the evidence regarding liability was complete, and agreed to present
argument on various motions, including that to amend the pleadings to name "D&K" as
an additional party the following day. This stipulation was repeated the following day.
(Rec. 1013, pp. 40:18-25, 41:1-17, 1013 p.1-3)
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to D&K. (Rec. 1014 pp.56-58) In doing so, it stated that there was no identity of interest
between D&K and Dan McNeill that could justify amending after the statute of limitations
had run. The court also held that permitting such an amendment would violate the Due
Process Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. (Rec.
984-987.)
The appellant has characterized this ruling as a mistake of law on the part of the court,
and has argued that it should therefore be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. (Brief of
Appellant p. 2) This, however, is incorrect. Under well established case law, a denial of a
motion to amend is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Sulzen v. Williams 977
P.2d 497 (Utah 1992) And, when this standard is applied to the facts on the record in this
matter, it becomes evident that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
In fact, the court made the proper decision.
1.) The motion was untimely and posed a significant opportunity for prejudice
to Mr. McNeil and to D&K.
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party must seek leave
of the court to amend its pleadings after a responsive pleading has been filed, and further
states that the court should freely grant such permission "when justice so requires." This
language has been interpreted to mean that the trial court should liberally allow amendments,
however, this discretion is not without bounds. When an amendment is untimely, unjustified,
or poses the risk of prejudice to the opposing party, the trial court, in its discretion, may
properly deny such a motion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 42, 87
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P.3d 734. And, it is clear that if the court decides to deny a motion to amend, it need not
find that all three conditions are satisfied. A denial may be justified on the basis of only one
or two of these factors. Id.9 at ^ 42. See also, Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC,
2009 UT 66 ^J 58. Here, after considerable argument, the trial court found that the motion
to amend was untimely, and that it posed the potential of prejudice to the parties. (Rec. 1014
p. 56-58) It therefore declined to allow the amendment. This decision is clearly supported
by the relevant law and the facts on the record.
In the recent case of Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d
734, the Court of Appeals undertook a detailed analysis of the issue of timeliness, and stated
that under established case law a proposed amendment is generally deemed to be untimely
when it is made in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation. These would include
motions made "after the close of discovery, upon the eve of trial, or after an order of
dismissal had been entered." Id., f 58. Here, the appellant failed to offer her motion until
after she had finished presenting evidence on the question of Mr. McNeil's liability, at a time
when the trial was nearly complete. (Rec 1013 pp. 40:18-25, 41:1-17) Since the close of
evidence is unquestionably later than the "close of discovery" or "the eve of trial", under the
standard definition of the term, Ms. Ottens' motion was untimely14.
14

Parenthetically, the Court should recognize that there was no justification for
waiting this long. Counsel for appellant knew of the existence of D&K from the
inception of the litigation. The police report that appellant intended to introduce into
evidence, and which appellant attached to numerous memoranda filed with the court,
indicates that D&K was the registered owner of the vehicle. See, for example, the Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, filed on September 26, 2006
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Similarly, the court's finding of unavoidable prejudice is also well supported. Under
Utah law a party is said to suffer unavoidable prejudice when the amendment would force
it to litigate issues for which it had no time to prepare. GLFP Ltd. v. CL Management, Ltd.,
2007 UT App 131 ^| 28, 163 P.3d 636. Here at least two parties would have been placed in
this position had Ms. Ottens been allowed to amend her complaint for a third time, after the
close of her case on liability.
First, as argued during the hearing, D&K, had never hired an attorney, had never
conducted discovery, and had never explored any defenses that it might have been available.
(Rec. 1014 p. 49:17-23, p. 50:1:24) Clearly, the lack of representation and lack of discovery
would have placed it at a disadvantage in defending the allegations of wrongdoing. Second,
since Ms. Ottens seems to want to amend her complaint not only to add D&K, but to add a
cause of action to pierce the corporate veil15, Mr. McNeil would also be severely prejudiced.
Had he been put on notice of that allegation, additional evidence would have been sought,
(R.155) Additionally Jake McNeil testified that he was working for D&K at the time of
the accident, and Mr. Lambert questioned him extensively about whether other employees
were there helping and asked if Jake could remember their names. {Deposition of Jake
McNeil, attached as addendum 1, p. 22:17-29, p. 26:1-12, 29:1-20.) Finally, the
Defendant himself noted in an early pleading that Jake had claimed to be working for
D&K. (R. 124-127.)
15
Mr. McNeil and his company could have an identity of interest only if the veil is
pierced, and the parties are treated as one. An identity of interest is defined as having the
same legal position and defenses, Penrose ^f 14. If the veil exists, and the parties are
treated as two separate individuals, then they would not have the same interest or position
in the litigation. As was indicated in oral argument, Dan McNeil spent three days
pointing to D&K as the employer of Jake McNeil. Had D&K been on notice and
represented, it might have disagreed with that assessment. Or it might have offered other
defenses. (Rec. 1014 p. 50:1-5)
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additional testimony would have been introduced, and additional arguments would have been
made, i.e., evidence regarding corporate formalities. Allowing Ms. Ottens to amend after the
close of evidence to make this argument would have allowed her to try a case that was not
plead and was not defended. This would have been unduly prejudicial, as the court expressly
found. (Rec. 1014 p.57)
2.) Permitting an amendment to bring in D&K under Rule 15(b) after the close
of evidence would have violated the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.
In response to the motion to amend, the trial court also considered whether it could
be proper under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which may permit an
amendment to conform to the evidence presented at trial. The court ultimately concluded
that there was insufficient evidence presented during trial to show that D&K and Dan McNeil
had an identity of interest or that the corporate veil should be breached16. Thus, if D&K were
to be brought in, it would be as an entirely separate party. Faced with this situation, the trial
court rightfully held that allowing Ms. Ottens to add a party, which was not represented, after
the close of evidence, and to allow a jury to assess damages and allocate fault on that party
would clearly be in derogation of the guarantees of due process. (Rec. 1014 p. 57:7-13)
The constitutions of both the United States and the state of Utah contain provisions
protecting persons from deprivation of rights and property without the due process of the law.
Utah Const Article I, § 7, U.S. Const, am. 14. As our courts have held, this requires, at a
16

For example, there was no evidence of commingling of funds or failure to
observe corporate formalities presented during trial.
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minimum, that a party be given notice of the allegations levied against it, and be afforded an
adequate opportunity to answer and defend. See, Searle v. Searle 2001 UT App 307 ^J 36,
38 P.3d307, quoting Peraltav. Heights Med. Or., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84,108 S.Ct. 896, 899,
99 L.Ed.2d 75. This would not have occurred in this case if Ms. Ottens had been allowed
to bring in D&K after evidence had closed.
Ironically, the very cases cited by Ms. Ottens to justify her attempt at the untimely
amendment hold that such an action would inevitably run afoul of the minimum requirements
of procedural due process. In Hernandez v. Baker 2004 UT App 462, 104 P.3d 664, the
plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Mr. Baker. After default was entered against
the defendant, the plaintiff moved to amend its pleadings and sought an immediate default
and amended judgment of a corporate entity owned by Mr. Baker, Performance Auto. The
trial court obliged, and naturally, Performance Auto sought a review on appeal on both
jurisdictional and due process grounds.
In its first argument, Performance claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
it because it was never served with a copy of the amended complaint, which it claimed was
a prerequisite for finding jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed, in part, with that
contention. It noted that if there was an identity of interest between the corporate entity and
Mr. Baker, jurisdiction would have been established by the filing of the amended complaint.
It further noted that the record showed only that Baker was an owner of the company, which
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was insufficient to establish an identity. Id., ^ 17. This, of course, is very similar to facts
present here.
More significant, however, this Court held that before judgment could be entered
against the corporate entity it would have to be given an opportunity to respond to the
allegations in the complaint and present its defenses to the court. Id., f 18. To do otherwise
would be deprive the corporation of its fundamental rights of procedural due process. Id., ^
18.
In making this decision, the Court relied on a decision issued by the United States
Supreme Court in Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d
530 (2000), which presented a factual scenario that was almost identical to that present in
Hernandez. (The roles were reversed. Judgment against the corporate entity was entered,
and then amended to include the individual owner.) The Supreme Court held that this
violated fundamental due process rights. It noted that Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provided for due process by requiring that a party named in an amendment be
served with a complaint, and that it also be allowed the requisite time to formulate its answer
and prepare its defense. Id. 466, 1584. And, it further stated that the clock on an added
party's time to respond does not start running until a new pleading is prepared, filed and
served. Id., 467, 1584-85. Finally, the court noted that Rule 15, and due process, required a
more orderly and reliable course. Id., 467, 1584.
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This is precisely what the trial court recognized when it claimed that Rule 15(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure could not be used to amend the complaint to bring in a new
party at this point of the trial. (Rec. 1014 pp. 56-58) While judgment may not have been
entered, the evidence was complete, and Ms. Ottens was requesting that the case immediately
proceed to that stage. Had the court allowed Ms. Ottens to bring D&K into the suit without
preparing or serving a complaint, and without allowing D&K the opportunity to answer and
defend, would have violated the order required by the rule and the dictates of fundamental
fairness. The court was correct in ruling that the appellant could not add a new party under
Rule 15(b) at that stage of the proceedings.
IV) Under Utah law a corporation is a distinct legal person. Defendant's
assertion that he did not employ Jake McNeil is not an affirmative defense that needs
to be pleaded under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Ms. Ottens has also alleged that the trial court erred when it allowed Mr. McNeil to
assert the he was not vicariously liable for the actions of his son, Jake McNeil, because Jake
was employed by D&K (rather than by Mr. McNeil himself). In making this argument, the
appellant first misinterprets, and then misapplies, two different rules of civil procedure, Rule
8(c), which deals with the necessity of asserting affirmative defenses, and Rule 9(1), which
deals with the allocation of fault to non-parties. Compounding these difficulties, Ms. Ottens
also misapplies the doctrine of the "corporate shield," which was not put into issue by any
pleadings in this case. This, unfortunately, creates additional confusion.
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A closer examination of the factual background, and a proper understanding of the
legal principals cited by the appellant, however, reveals that the trial court's decision on this
issue was well founded. Simply stated, Mr. McNeil did not fail to assert an affirmative
defense, and was not required to identify D&K in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, In the interests of clarity, and analytical rigor, each of
the points will be addressed separately.
1.) The testimony that D&K was Jake's employer is not an affirmative defense
that needed to be set out in the answer to the complaint.
One of Ms. Ottens' primary complaints is that the trial court allowed Mr. McNeil to
argue that he was not Jake's employer (and thereby not vicariously liable for his negligence),
and to make that point stronger by showing that Jake was, in fact, employed by D&K. Ms.
Ottens apparently believes that this was an affirmative defense that must be set out in the
pleadings, or forever waived, under Rule 8(c) of the Utah Civil Procedure, This argument
falters on two separate grounds. First, it is based upon a fundamental misconception of basic
principles of corporate law. Second, it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the
affirmative defense. Once these two problems are sorted out, Ms. Ottens' complaints are
revealed to be insubstantial and unworthy of consideration by this Court.
At the outset, when assessing the propriety of the trial court's decision on this issue,
it is necessary to remember that under long established Utah law a corporate entity is vested
with its own legal existence. Almost six decades ago, our Supreme Court expressly stated
that "a corporation is a statutory entity which is regarded as having an existence and
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personality distinct from that of its members of stockholders." Surgical Supply Center v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 223 P.2d 593,595,118
Utah 632 (Utah 1950.) And, even earlier, the Court made clear that a corporation is an
"artificiaror "juridical" person with an independent existence. Stewart Livestock Co., v.
Ostler 144 P.2d 276, 285, 105 Utah 529 (Utah 1943). In short, the law considers D&K to
be one person, and Dan McNeil another.
It is equally important to understand the nature of an affirmative defense, in order to
understand why Mr. McNeil was not required to specifically assert that D&K was Jake's
employer in his answer to the Second Amended Complaint. In Prince v. Bear River Mutual
Ins., Co., 2002 UT 68,ffi[31-33, 56 P.3 524, the Utah Supreme Court explained that an
affirmative defense is one which employs matters that are outside of, or are extrinsic to, the
plaintiffs prima facie case, and which, if proven, will defeat the cause of action even if all
the allegations in the complaint are true17. Clearly, this is not what Mr. McNeil was doing
when he identified D&K as Jake's employer.
In paragraph six (6) of her Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Ottens alleged that the
defendant hired and paid his son, and another unidentified male, to move personal items,
including the chair at issue, from his rental in Bluffdale to an apartment on 13th East and
7200 South. (Rec. 430). In response to that allegation, Mr. McNeil admitted that the chair
belonged to him, but denied everything else, including the fact that he employed and paid

17

See also, Black's Law Dictionary 430 (7th ed. 1999)
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Jake McNeil. (Rec. 422). Even a cursory reading of this answer, then, shows that Mr.
McNeil was directly controverting an essential element of the plaintiffs prima facie case for
vicarious liability; he expressly denied that he was Jake's employer. The testimony about
D&K that was elicited by Ms. Ottens' counsel at trial18 did not change the nature of Mr.
McNeil's defense in any way. In identifying D&K as the employer (Rec. 1010 p. 27, 1012
p. 5:2) the witnesses merely provided additional information that was entirely consistent with
Mr. McNeil's answer to the complaint. In short, they testified that Dan was not the employer,
but D&K was. Because this undermines an element of plaintiff s prima facie case, it is not
an affirmative defense, as defined by our Supreme Court in Prince v. Bear River Mutual
Insurance.
2.) The corporate shield was not used as an affirmative defense by Mr. McNeil
in this case.
At the center of Ms. Ottens' claim that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. McNeil
to use the corporate shield as a defense (without expressly setting it out in his pleadings) lies
a fundamental misunderstanding of what the corporate veil is. The doctrine is, in reality,
merely a logical inference drawn from the fact that corporations and their individual
shareholders, officers and directors are different juridical persons. Black's Law Dictionary
describes it as "the legal assumption that the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its
shareholders, so that shareholders are exempt from liability for the corporation's action."
Black's Law Dictionary 341 (7th ed. 1999).
18

Similar testimony was given in Jake's deposition.
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Under established Utah law, this means that the veil operates to protect an individual
shareholder or officer of a corporation from responsibility for corporate torts, if the only basis
of his alleged liability is her position with the company. This would include liability that is
predicated on the accusation that the general duties of an officer include oversight of the
company's operations. Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison 2003 UT 14, ff 19,
21, 70 P.3d 35. It is equally well established, however, that the doctrine does not immunize
an officer or shareholder from liability, if he or she personally participated in the tortuous act
in question. Id, f 19, quoting 3 A William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law
of Private Corporations §1137, at 209 (rev. ed. 2002)
Here, Mr. McNeil did not argue that the corporate veil immunized him from liability
for damages caused by his personal acts, because those acts were taken on behalf of the
corporation. In fact, when this issue was raised by counsel for Ms. Ottens, the trial court
made specific inquiries about what was being argued.
The court stated:
"Let's ask Mr. Glauser, because he's aching to tell us, are you bringing up the
shield?
And counsel for Mr. McNeil replied:
"No your honor..." and then explained : "Their sixth paragraph said, "Dan
hired" "Dan paid", okay, are you with me? We deny that Dan didn't hire, and
Dan didn't pay."
(Rec. 1014 p. 30:4-18)
Then later in the argument, counsel clarified again, when he stated:
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" I mean, we're — this defense isn't "We're hiding behind the corporate
shield", the defense is, "It wasn't me. It was D&K"
Upon hearing this clarification, the Court stated:
"Yeah, I think that's the problem. We're confusing someone pointing to
someone else to using the corporation and saying "I was acting for the
corporation"."
(Rec. 1014 p. 31:5-12)
There is only one way to read this exchange, Mr. McNeil was not attempting to use
the corporate entity to shield himself from responsibility for acts he personally committed.
The corporate entity was brought up to bolster the argument that Dan McNeil did not hire or
pay Jake McNeil, i.e., to counter the claim of vicarious liability that was levied in Ms.
Ottens' complaint. It may not be said too many times; this line of evidence was intended to
prove "it wasn't me, it was someone else." As set out above, such an argument attacks the
plaintiffs prima facie case, and is not, therefore, an affirmative defense that must be set out
or waived.
Accordingly, Ms. Ottens' extensive review of cases showing that a corporate officer
or shareholder might be held liable for a tort under certain circumstances is misplaced. Mr.
McNeil acknowledges that the personal commission of tortuous acts might lead to liability
for which the corporate shield is no defense. As shown in the opening sections of this brief,
however, this was not the case here, and this was not the purpose of identifying D&K as the
employer of Jake McNeil.
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3.) Mr. McNeil had no affirmative duty to designate D&K under Rule 9 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ms. Ottens also asserts that if Mr. McNeil was going to argue that D&K was Jake's
employer, then he was obligated to designate it as a party to whom fault should be allocated
under Rule 9(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the purpose and requirements of rule, which are best discerned by
looking at the rule itself. It states, as follows:
"(1) Allocation of fault
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B,
Chapter 5, Part 8 shall file:
(1)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can
be allocated; and
(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party
identifying the non-party, including name, address, telephone number and
employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state.
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by
compliance with this rule.
The plain language of the rule requires that a party make the designation only if it
intends to ask the finder of fact to allocate some portion of fault to a non-party when making
its findings. The rule does not create an affirmative obligation to name all persons who might
have caused a particular accident; rather, it merely provides that you must identify the
individual, if you wish the finder of fact to allocate fault to that person.
Here the defendant met that obligation by identifying Jake McNeil, who was operating
the truck at the time of the accident. And it made that designation in both the answers to the
initial complaint and to the amended pleading filed years later. (Rec. 65-74, 422-428)
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Again, it is instructive to note that the rationale for this decision was explored during
the Motions hearing that was held after the close of evidence. When addressing this issue
with the trial court, Mr. McNeil's counsel stated that there was no need to allocate fault to
D&K, because its potential liability, as an employer, was merely derivative. In other words,
if Jake, who was identified under Rule 9, was allocated 10% of fault for the accident, then
D&K, as Jake's employer, would be liable for that very same 10%. (Rec. 1014 pp. 54:11-25,
55:1-14) Since no additional fault would be allocated to D&K, there was no practical reason
to name them under Rule 9.
V) Ms. Ottens has failed to marshal the evidence on the evidentiary rulings issued
by the court in this matter. This is ample reason to deny the requested relief.
Under long established Utah law, a trial court is vested with broad discretion to
determine the admissibility of evidence. And absent an abuse of discretion, rulings on
admissibility will not be disturbed. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96 ^f 20, 989 P.2d 52. Asset
out in earlier portions of this brief, where a party alleges that the trial court made an error of
this sort, it is incumbent it to marshal all of the evidence, on both sides of the question, to
demonstrate the presence of an abuse. Kealamakia, Inc., v. Kealamakia 2009 UT App 148
% 10, 213 P.3d 13. Even a cursory review of the brief filed by Ms. Ottens shows that this did
not occur with respect to the evidentiary issues raised on appeal. She did not order the
transcripts of the hearings on the motions in limine, her statement of facts makes no reference
to any portion of the record on appeal, and the argument section of the brief is also devoid
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of any such reference. Instead, Ms. Ottens merely argues that the court could have made a
different decision. This is insufficient.
It is well established that when a party fails to fulfill its obligation to marshal the
evidence, the appellate courts may simply decline to consider the issues on appeal. Traco
Steel Erectors v. Comtrol, Inc. 2009 UT 81, ^{ 17-19. It would be proper for the court to
take this action in this case.
VI) The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to admit evidence
that Mr. Dan McNeil was cited for a moving violation and that he paid the ticket. The
evidence had no probative value to the prosecution of the case.
While acknowledging that courts traditionally have been loath to permit the
introduction of evidence of traffic citations or convictions in civil matters, Ms. Ottens has
argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to do so in this case. She
argues the evidence, which would generally be precluded by Rule 416 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, was intended to prove that Dan McNeil was the actual driver of the vehicle at the
time the chair flew out of the pick-up truck. Accordingly, Ms. Ottens believes the evidence
was permissible because it was not intended to demonstrate negligence on Mr. McNeil's part,
nor was it intended to impeach his credibility. (These are both impermissible purposes under
Rule 416.)
There is a fatal flaw in this reasoning, however, which arises out of the fact that the
relevant pleadings did not make that allegation, and the question of who was driving was not
at issue. Ms. Ottens filed her second amended complaint on November 13,2007. (Rec. 429-
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434) Nowhere in that pleading is it alleged that Dan was operating the vehicle at the time of
the accident, rather the claims were that he negligently secured the chair at issue and that he
was vicariously liable for the loss because he was the employer of Jake McNeil, who was
driving the pick-up. (Rec. 429-434). In his answer, Mr. McNeil admitted that Jake was the
driver (Rec. 422-428). For purposes of trial, therefore, the identity of the driver had been
established by the pleadings. Accordingly, any evidence that was intended to demonstrate
that Dan was actually driving the vehicle was simply not relevant, i.e., it did not tend to prove
a fact of consequence to the determination of the action. Rule 401 Utah Rules of Evidence,
see also, State v. Johns 615 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Utah 1980).
While the transcript of the hearing on the motion to preclude evidence of the citation
was not made part of the record on appeal, the trial court's views on this question are clear.
On the last day of trial, Ms. Ottens argued a similar motion, when she sought to introduce the
investigating officer's report into evidence. The court refused to permit this, stating that in
order to allow evidence that Dan was the driver of the vehicle Ms. Ottens would need to
amend her complaint once again, because the theory of the case presented in pleadings, and
even on the proposed jury instructions, did not include the claim that Dan was the driver of
the vehicle. (Record 1014 p. 6:6-8) Rather, it was that Jake was acting on behalf of Dan.
(Record 1014 p. 11:1-3). Consequently, the court ruled that such evidence did not fit the
theory of the case. It also held that to amend the complaint to present the new theory, and
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possibly allow such evidence to be introduced, would be highly prejudicial, unfairly
prejudicial, and too late. (Record 1014 12:1-20)
As set out above, this same line of reasoning would apply to the evidence of the
citation and payment. It does not fit with the theory of case set out in the pleadings, and is
therefore not probative in any way. And to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her pleadings at such
a late stage of the case would be improper due to its prejudicial effect19. Daniels v. Gamma
West Brachy therapy 2009 UT 66 \ 57. In either case, the court was well within its discretion
to find either that the evidence was irrelevant or that its relevance was outweighed by undue
prejudice. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Accordingly, this court should not disturb the lower court's ruling. Jensen v. IHC Hospital,
Inc., 2003 UT 51,1J57, 82 P.3d 1076.
VII) The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. McNeil to ask
when Ms. Ottens retained counsel.
Ms. Ottens also contests a second evidentiary ruling issued by the court, which
allowed Mr. McNeil to ask when she retained counsel. During the course of the trial, this
question was raised directly and briefly. Ms. Ottens was asked if she retained him within two

19

Ms. Ottens had the opportunity to explore this matter fully in the deposition of
Mr. McNeil, and he answered questions about the citation and guilty plea at that time.
This deposition occurred in August 2006. (Rec. 780). More than a year later, she amended
her complaint and abandoned the claim that Dan was the driver of the vehicle. (Rec. 429434) Counsel for the defense objected to Ms. Ottens' attempt at trial to change the theory
of the case to name Dan as the driver (Recl014 p. 9:5-6), and the trial court agreed that
it was improper. (Rec. 1014 p. 12:1-20) There is not even the hint that the trial court
abused its discretion in keeping out this type of evidence.
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months of the accident, and she answered that she believed so. (Rec. 1011 p. 139:6-11) After
the question was answered, no further inquiries were made.20
In papers filed just prior to the start of trial, in particular the appellant's fourth motion
in limine, Ms. Ottens requested that the trial court preclude the defense from introducing a
variety of evidence, including any line of questioning, concerning when she retained an
attorney. The appellant simply argued that such questions were irrelevant under all
circumstances. (Rec. 764).
Counsel for the defense pointed out two potential reasons why such evidence might
be relevant. First, as the Supreme Court recognized in the case of Pennington v. Allstate 973
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), early attorney involvement in a case, and possible counsel initiated
referrals to healthcare providers can support an inference that medical bills and treatment are
inflated or unreasonable. (Rec. 806). Additionally, the defense anticipated that Ms. Ottens
would attempt to portray Mr. McNeil as dishonest with respect to the information contained
in the police report, and assert that she was prejudiced as a result of those actions21. The fact
that Ms. Ottens retained counsel almost immediately after the accident tends to undermine
the claim of prejudice. As pointed out in the memorandum filed in connection with that
motion, early attorney involvement could imply that there was adequate opportunity to clarify

20

The same information was contained in a letter written by Ms. Otten's counsel
dated May 22, 2002, which were part of records introduced at trial. (Exhibits 1: Tab 7,
006, Rec. 1011 p. 139:22)
21
This proved to be the case. (Rec 1014)
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the statements in the report, and therefore lead to the conclusion that any prejudice suffered
was the fault of the appellant. (Rec. 806-807)
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and the cases that interpret its provisions,
make clear that the threshold for finding relevance is very low. In State v. Smedley 2003 UT
App. 79, 67 P.3d 1005, this Court held that evidence with even the slightest probative value
is relevant. Clearly, this standard is met here.
A fundamental question in this case, had it gone to a jury, was whether the plaintiff
treated reasonably and whether the treatment was related to the injuries claimed. Since the
Supreme Court has recognized that early attorney involvement may imply, under the right
circumstances, that the treatment was not reasonable, then the simple question of when one
retained an attorney is relevant. If the evidence could be misused in argument at a later time,
as Ms. Ottens seems to suggest might happen (Rec. 828), then a timely objection could be
made. This does not mean, however, that the inquiry should not be made.
Similarly, the question was directly relevant to the question of prejudice asserted by
counsel at trial. If one claims that one is deceived, the amount of time one had professional
help to clear up disputed facts is certainly relevant to that issue. Again, the question about
when counsel was retained helps clarify that issue.
In both cases, the evidence was relevant under the terms of Rule 401 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, and in neither case was it used in the manner suggested by Ms. Ottens in
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her pretrial motions. Simply put, the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice,
and therefore the evidence was admissible under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, this court should uphold the directed verdict entered in
favor of Dan McNeil. It should also uphold the ruling that denied the plaintiff the right to
amend its complaint to add Jake McNeil as a party after the statute of limitation had run. It
should also uphold the denial of the motions to amend the complaint to add D&K as a party,
and to change its theory of liability to allege that Dan McNeil was the driver of the vehicle.
These motions were made after the close of evidence and were therefore untimely. Finally,
the court should uphold the evidentiary rulings made, as the court was clearly within its rights
to determine what evidence was presented at trial.
DATED this 28th day of December, 2009.
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

RICMRD K. Qy&fk^
MICHAEL W. d & ^ f T
Attorneys for Appellee
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Addendum No. 1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JENNIFER OTTENS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 050911123
Judge Frederick

vs.
NICKOLAS COLEMAN and DAN
McNEIL,
Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF: JACOB McNEIL

August 10, 2006
10:13 a.m.
Location:
Arrow Legal Solutions Group
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah
Reporter: Jeanette Lund, CSR, RPR, and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

CD ENCLOSED

Q

A REPORTING, INC

Jacob McNeil * August 10, 2006

Q

Do you recall on the day if your father was at

all supervising the loading of the -- his possessions?
A

Yes, that's pretty much all he was doing.

Q

And do you recall if he, your sister -- or

your half sister, Kaedee, or Kim McNeil helped load the
pickup truck that you drove?
A

I would imagine everybody probably helped.

I

don't know if they directly loaded that or -- we were
all helping.
Q

Do you know if your father owned the home at

Pony Express, Bluffdale?
A

I believe he rented or leased.

I'm not

positive.
Q

Do you know if he had -- and you may not --

any homeowner's or rental insurance?
A

I'm not sure.

Q

And you indicated that this was a workday that

he asked you and the other employees to help work -- to
load his home?
A

Yes.

Q

And did he pay you from company funds for

doing that that day?
A

Yes, I believe so.

Q

And you may not know any of this, but I'll ask

anyway.

Do you know if he treated these employees as

Page 22
O & A Reporting

Jacob McNeil * August 10, 2006

A

I didn't help finish.

I just helped during

the eight-hour period that I was there for work and then
that was it,
Q

So did you work a whole eight hours helping

the move?
A

Honestly, I can't say it was an exact eight,

but as far as he wanted our help, then I helped.

When

he said that you guys are done, then we were done.
Q

How were you paid for that day?

A

I believe it was just on our paychecks.

Q

So you didn't receive, like, a separate check

for that particular day?
A

No, no.

Q

I don't think I have any more questions.

Let

me just look over my notes.
Does the name Kirk Gilger mean anything to
you?
A

Yes, it means a lot to me.

Q

Who is Kirk?

A

Kirk is a contractor, a building contractor

who we used to do work for.
Q

Do you know if he was working for your father

as a contractor back during the March 29th, 2002 time
frame?
A

We would have been working for him.

We're
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A

No.

Q

Were you able to get any of the money back?

A

Nope.

Q

Did you ask your father about that situation?

A

Yes, I asked him and Kirk.

Q

Nothing became of it, I assume?

A

Nope.

Q

At the time that this accident occurred, how

long had you had that truck?
A

It was a short period of time.

Maybe six

months.
Q

And how long afterward did you have the truck

until he came and got it?
A

That's until he came and got it, so I didn f t

have it any time after that.
night.
Q

He came and got it at

I was in bed.
What I mean is after March 29th, 2002, how

long did you have the truck?
A

I don't know.

I don't recall.

Q

Was it a couple months or several years?

A

Probably a month or two, maybe.

A couple

months.
Q

Do you remember any of the -- I already asked

you if you remembered the names of any of the employees
at that time that were helping move.

Just in general,
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do you r emember the names of any of the employees that
worked for D&K around the winter, spring of 2002?
A

No, not that I can tell you, you know,

honestl y and accurately.
Q

Did you ever have any friends that worked for

Wh at I mean by friends is people that you either

D&K?

knew prior to them working for D&K or people that you
formed a friendship or a relationship with -A

1

Q
A

I have before, yes.
And what are the names of those friends?
My friend Daniel Garamendi worked there for a

little w hile.
Q

Do you remember during what period of time?

A

I don't.

Q

Is it possible he worked during the winter and

spring o f 2002?
A

I don't know.

Q

Do you know how he can be reached?

A

I don't.

Q

Do you know how to spell Garamendi?

A

I don't.

G-A-R-A -- I don't know.

It's a

hard one •
Q

Do you know the name of his parents?

A

I don't.

Q

Do you know the name of any of his brothers,

Page 29

Addendum No .2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JENNIFER OTTENS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 050911123
Judge Frederick

vs.
NICKOLAS COLEMAN and
DAN McNIEL
Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF: DAN McNEIL

August 10, 2006
1:40 p.m.
Location:
Arrow Legal Solutions Group
266 East 7200 South
Midvale, Utah
Reporter: Jeanette Lund, CSR, RPR, and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

CD ENCLOSED
INC
1R79

<^vi*-K M o , ™

Q^

Q „ U T „1 ^ /~V

Dan McNeil * August 10, 2006

there on the side of the road.
Q

So you just saw it and you didn't stop,

correct?
A

Huh-uh, I was -- no.

No.

Sorry.

Q

And then when you called Jake, were you still

traveling?
A

Oh, yes.

Q

And then did you continue on until you got to

the apartment on 13th?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you at any time talk to any police

officers?
A

I don't ever recall talking to a police

officer.
Q

Did you ever retrieve the chair?

A

No.

Q

What caused you to surmise when you saw the

The chair never got back with me, no.

chair, or conclude that it was one of yours?
A

Because my chairs are very distinct.

They are

black with a white seat on them.
Q

And is that what you saw when you drove past

this chair?
A

Yes.

Q

I gather based upon your testimony, then, you

ended up with just three chairs and you didn't ever
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doing th at sort of during a normal workday and that, in
effect, you were paying him to help move by, you know,
giving h im a regular paycheck as you would for any other
day of work that he would do for you.
correct?

Does that sound

Does that sound familiar?

A

I don't know.

Q

Yeah.

I don't remember what day it

was ,
He probably remembers better because he

was the one getting the money.

A

Probably.

I don't know.

To be really honest

with you , I couldn't tell you if he was on the payroll
or., •

Q

So if he has a firm recollection of that,

you d probably be more willing to trust his recollection
than yours?

A

Yes, I would have to go with what he says

because I can't remember the day, let alone...

Q

Why didn't you -- when you saw your chair on

the side of the freeway, why didn't you go back and get
it?

A

Well, when you're going 50 miles an hour or 55

miles an hour down the freeway and you glance and you

see some thing, you don't go like, Oop, I've got to stomp
on the b rakes right here.

Q

Why not wheel off on the next exit and go
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1

A

At the very top, where it has the accident

2

location, date of the accident, the time, direction of

3

travel.

4

handwriting.

5

Then everything below that, that's not my

Q

So where it says "D & K Finish Carpentry,"

6

and "Driver's name: Dan McNeil," you don't recognize that

7

handwriting?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Typically when these accident information

10
11

That's not my handwriting.

forms are filled out, who puts the information there?
A

Specifically, it would be the owner of that

12

vehicle, the driver.

13

medical treatment, then we would gather that information,

14

I would fill it out myself.

In this case, the top portion

15

looks likes my handwriting.

The remainder is not my

16

handwriting.

17

Q

In cases where somebody is having

If you could go back to the accident

18

information form where it has the driver's name as "Jen

19

Ottens" and take a look at that.

20

A

Sure.

21

Q

Keep your thumb on the Dan McNeil, because I

22

One moment.

I am turning there.

am going to go back to that.

23

A

Okay.

I am there at that page.

24 J

Q

Is the handwriting in the Utah Highway Patrol

1

that Dan McNeil was the cIriver of the vehicle with the

2

chair?

3

A

1 thought quite a lot about this.

From my

4

memory, I remember being given a license plates of the

5

vehicle that dropped the chair.

6

correctly, that is how I got Dan McNeil's name -- would be

7

from a license plate.
Q

8
9

If my memory serves me

Do you know if you or any other officer ever

spoke with Dan McNeil?

10

A

11

over the phone.

12

spoken to him directly.

13

a specific memory of actually standing in front of him.

14

did at one point have a telephone conversation with him.

15
16

Q

I did.

But if I remember correctly, it was

I don't remember.

I may or may not have

It is really weird.

I don't have

Do you recall whether or not Dan McNeil

communicated that he was the driver of the vehicle?

17

A

|

No, I don't specifically remember him saying

18

that.

19

if you want me to tell you that, I will, or wait for the

20

question.

The only thing I remember about the conversation,

21

Q

Go ahead and tell me what you remember.

22

A

The specific memory I have of the

23

conversation with -- I believe it would have been Dan

24

McNeil was telling me that he was moving and moving stuff

I

1

that storage, or wherevei the stuff was being dropped off,

2

that he was missing a chair when he got there.

3

Q

Anything else?

4

A

No, but that's ]ust the one thing that sticks

5

m

my mind, because I felt like I had the correct person

6

at that point m

7

Q

time.

And based upon your earlier testimony again,

8

you don't know if the information filled out on the Utah

9

Highway Patrol Accident Information Form was filled out by

10
11

Dan McNeil or any other individual?
A

No.

I don't remember.

I remember having

12

gone to the address down m

13

several times.

14

left a card.

15

that suggestion to me to leave a caid on their vehicle

16

requesting contact.

17

individual.

18

the mail or if I actually went down and handed it to him.

19

I don't have a specific memory of that.

20

Q

the south end of the valley

Couldn't get m

contact with him, so I

One of the other experienced troopers gave

Then I was contacted by that

I can't remember if I sent the form to him

m

Do you know or do you recall any of the

21

demeanor of any of the persons in the accident 7

22

I mean by "demeanor" is nervous, angry, confused, upset,

23

dazed; any of those physical signs that you noticed on any

24

of the participants in the accident?

25

A

No, I don't.

And what

*1

do you ever recall anyone bringing it to your attention

2

that a son of Dan McNeil had any involvement or anything

3

to do with the moving of that chair?

4

A

No, I don't.

5

Q

Do you ever recall Mr. McNeil or it being

6
7

brought to your attention that Mr. McNeil, at least as far
J

as his representations to you, or the highway patrol, that
he was the driver of the vehicle?

What I mean by "Mr." is

Dan McNeil as noted on the accident information form.
10 I
LI

A

Do I remember he represented that he was the

driver in the situation?

L2

Q

Correct.

3

A

I don't have a specific memory of that.

Like

4

I said, I would just have to go off the police report,

5 J

showing that the statement that I received showed that Dan
McNeil was the driver under the driver information, but I
don't remember him specifically telling me, "Yes, 1 was
the driver of the vehicle."

9 I
0

J

MR. LAMBERT:

I don't have anything further.

There may be a follow-up.
FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. WRIGHT:

i I

1

Q

Wright again.

I have a few follow-ups.

My name is Michael

Let me ask you briefly two things because I
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West's Utah Code Annotated Cuirentncss
Constitution of Utah
*g Article 1 Declaration of Rights
-• Sec. 7. [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law

CROSS REFERENCES
Abortion, findings and policies of legislature, see § 76-7-301 1
Crimes involving civil rights, penalties for hate crimes, see ^ 7 6 3-203 3
Eminent domain, generally, see § 78B-6-501
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Constitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice Damages Cap Under the Utah Constitution Magleby, 21 F Contemp L 217(1995)
Eyewitness Identification in Utah A Changing Perspective, Hale, 1988 Utah L Rev 113 (1988)
[f the Postman Always ^'Stings'1 Twice. Who is the Next Target}-An Fxammation of the Fntiapment Theory, Zabnskie, 19 J Contemp I 217(1993)
KU1 V ) Wilkinson Another Episode in the Fan 1 rial/Free Piess Saga, Ilagen, 1985 Utah L Re\ 739 (1985)
Rethinking Utah's Death Penalty Statute A Constitutional Requnement foi the Substantive Nan owing oi Aggravating ( lrcumslances, W eron, 1994 Utah L Rev 1107 (1994)
State Constitutions as a Source oi Individual Liberties Expanding Protection tor Abortion Under Medicaid,
\ucrmck 19 J Contcmp L 185(1993)
State ex rel B R A. guide to propeily considering rehabilitation eudence in paiental lights termination proceedings Con 1 Hill 9 JL & l a m Stud 341 (2007)
State i Heneia The Utah Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Utah's Controversial Insanity Defense Statute 22 J
Contemp I 221 (1996)
State v Ramitez Strengthening Utah's Standaid ior Admitting Evidence Identification Lviden.ce, Whitehead,
1992 UtahL Rev 647(1992)
Termination of Parental Rights Statute in Utah An Argument for Statutory Specificity, Kendell, 13 J Contemp
L 341 (1987)

United States Constitution Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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U C A 1953 §72-7-409

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 72. TRANSPORTATION CODE
CHAPTER 7. PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS
PART 4. VEHICLE SIZE, WEIGHT, AND LOAD LIMITATIONS
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the
LexisNexis Group All rights reserved
72-7-409 Loads on vehicles —Limitations --Confining, securing, and fastening load required —Penalty
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Agricultural product" means any raw product which is derived from agriculture, including silage, hay,
straw, gram, manure, and other similar product
(b) "Vehicle" has the same meaning set forth in Section 41-1 a-102
(2) A vehicle may not be operated or moved on any highway unless the vehicle is constructed or loaded to prevent its contents from dropping, sifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping
(3) (a) In addition to the requirements under Subsection (2), a vehicle carrying dirt, sand, gravel, rock fragments,
pebbles, crushed base, aggregate, any other similar material, or scrap metal shall have a covering over the entire
load unless
(I) the highest point of the load does not extend above the top of any exterior wall or sideboard of the cargo
compartment of the vehicle, and
(n) the outer edges of the load are at least six inches below the top inside edges of the exterior walls or sideboards of the cargo compartment of the vehicle
(b) The following material is exempt from the provisions of Subsection (3)(a)
(l) hot mix asphalt,
(n) construction debris or scrap metal if the debris or scrap metal is a size and in a form not susceptible to being blown out of the vehicle,
(in) material being transported across a highway between two parcels of property that would be contiguous
but for the highway that is being crossed, and
(IV) material listed under Subsection (3)(a) that is enclosed on all sides by containers, bags, or packaging
(c) A chemical substance capable of coating or bonding a load so that the load is confined on a vehicle, may
be considered a covering for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) so long as the chemical substance remains effective
at confining the load

UT ST § 72-7-409
U C A 1953 §72-7-409
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(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a vehicle or implement of husbandry carrying an agricultural product,
if the agricultural product is
(a) being transported in a manner which is not a hazard or a potential hazard to the safe operation of the
vehicle or to other highway users, and
(b) loaded in a manner that only allows minimal spillage
(5) (a) An authorized vehicle performing snow removal services on a highway is exempt from the requirements
of this section if the vehicle's load is screened to a particle size established by a rule of the department
(b) This section does not prohibit the necessary spreading of any substance connected with highway maintenance, construction, securing traction, or snow removal
(6) A person may not operate a vehicle with a load on any highway unless the load and any load covering is
fastened, secured, and confined to prevent the covering or load from becoming loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to the safe operation of the vehicle, or to other highway users
(7) Before entering a highway, the operator of a vehicle carrying any material listed under Subsection (3), shall
remove all loose material on any portion of the vehicle not designed to carry the material
(8) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
History: L 1963, ch 39, § 146, 1990, ch 88, § 4, 1996, ch 58, § 1, 1997, ch 50, § 1, 1998, ch 224, § 1, C
1953, 27-12-146, renumbered by L 1998, ch 270, § 202
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1997 amendment, effectne May 5, 1997, deleted Subsection (2)(b)(i) which read
M
coalM and redesignated former Subsections (2)(b)(n) to (2)(b)(v) as (2)(b)(i) to (2)(b)(iv)
The 1998 amendment by ch 224, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsections (1) and (4), redesignating the other
subsections accordingly and making related changes
The 1998 amendment by ch 270, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared
a s § 27-12-146
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office ol Legislative Research and General Counsel
Cross-References. --Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3- 301
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Negligence
— Effect of violation
Trial court ruling that violation of former section requiring loads on vehicles to be securely fastened and covered
was negligence as a matter of law and that the trial should be had on the issue of damages alone was erroneous
since, in Utah, violation of a safety statute is regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, and the presumption arising therefrom is rebuttable by a showing of justification or excuse Klafta v Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-12-25
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentncss
Title 78B. Judicial Code
^1 Chapter 2. Statutes of Limitations
^H Part 3. Other Than Real Property
-4 § 78B-2-307. Within four years
An action may be brought within four years:

(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received:
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under Section
25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

CREDIT(S)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currcntncss
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rcfs & Annos)
^ 1 Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders

-* RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS
(a) Claims for Relief- A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.

(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted
and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a
denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to
deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when
he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11.

(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.

(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a
pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.

(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions
are required.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8
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(2) A partv may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in
one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufti
ciency of one or more of the alternative statements A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses
as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both All state
ments shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11

(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Living with Twombly John H Bogart, 22 Utah B J 23 ( M a i c h / \ p n l 2009)
The Recovery of Attorney Fees m Utah A Pioceduial Primer foi Practitioners Magleby, 23 J Contemp I 379
(J 997)
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Pleading € ^ > 34 48, 50, 53, 78, 87, 112 to 129, 142
Westlav\ Key Number Searches 302k34, 302L48, 302k50, 302k53, 302k78, 302k87, 302kl 12 to 302kl29,
302kl42
C J S Pleading §^ 81 to 82, 84 to 89, 116 to 124, 132 to 133, 147 to 1M, 156 to 157, 160 to 162, 183 to 196
,201
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
84 A L R 2nd 1077, Recovery on Quantum Meruit Where Only Express Contract is Pleaded, Under Fedtial
Rules oi Civil Procedure 8 and 54 and Similar State Statutes or Rules

Forms
Am Jur PI & Pr Foims Accoid and Satisfaction ^ 9, Procedural Rules References

Am Jur PI & Pr Foims Automobiles &. llwy liaffic § 603, Procedural Rules References

Am Jur PI & Pr Foims Automobiles &. Hwy liaffic ^ 1292, Statutory and Procedural Rules References
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West's Utah Code Annotated Cuircntness
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rets & Annos)
*g Part III Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
- • RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS

(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to
sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party A party may raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue
or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge If raised as an issue, the party relying on such
capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial

(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant When a party does not know the name of an adverse party, he may
state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly

(a)(3) Actions to quiet title, description of interest of unknown parties In an action to quiet title wherein any of
the parties are designated in the caption as ''unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as
"all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto "

(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally

(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to
a\er generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence

(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document
was issued or the act done in compliance with law

(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter

Utah Rules of Ci\il Procedure, Rule 9
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showing jurisdiction to render it A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and
when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts

(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are
material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter

(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated

(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the
defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied
on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation,
if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it If such allegation is
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action
is so barred

(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof

(j) Libel and slander.
(j)(l) Pleading defamatory matte? It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose, but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff If such allegation is
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or
spoken

(f)(2) Pleading defense In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and,
whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances

(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint

(1) Allocation of fault.
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8 shall file

(!)(!)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated, and
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(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state.

(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading if then
known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party discovers the
factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery
plan under Rule 26(f). The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later
than 90 days before trial.

(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule.

CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; May 2, 2005; November 1, 2008.]

CROSS REFERENCES
Joinder of defendants, allocation of fault to non-party, description of factual and legal basis on which fault
can be allocated and information identifying non-party, see § 78B-5-821.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Damages € ^ > 142.
Limitation of Actions € ^ 176 to 192.
Pleading € = > 46, 18,59.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k46; 302kl8; 302k59; 115kl42; 241kl76 to 241kl92.
C.J.S. Damages §§ 225 to 228.
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 269 to 285, 287 to 290.
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 70 to 71, 96, 136 to 138, 162, 165.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Forms
Am. Jur. PL & Pr. Forms Labor and Labor Relations § 3, Procedural Rules References.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Standing,
Challenging constitutionality of legislation, see Diamond v. Charles, U.S.111.1986, 106 S Ct. 1697, 476
U.S. 54,90 L.Ed.2d 48.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Cuncntness
State Court Rules
*I3 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rets & Aiinos)
*g Pait ill Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
_• RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served Otherwise a
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall
be freely gi\ en when justice so requires A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or withm 10 days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otheiw lse orders

(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him m maintaining his action or defense upon the merits The
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence

(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading

(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
vvhich have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented Permission may be granted even
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense If the court deems it ad
visable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Limitation of Actions € ^ > 127, 124
Parties € ^ 54, 62
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cnrrentness
State Court Rules
*S Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos)
*§ Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits
- • RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye. Walden, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839
(1986).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Criminal Law <£x? 338.
Evidence C ^ 99.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k338; 157k99.
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 710, 730.
C.J.S. Evidence §§ 2 to 5, 197 to 199, 204, 206.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Forms
Am. Jur. PI. & Pi. Forms Evidence § 19, Procedural Rules References.
Treatises and Practice Aids
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 25:46, Utah.
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currcntness
State Court Rules
^§ Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos)
*§ Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits
-• RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Esielle. 445 F.Supp.
647 (N.D.Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due
process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect Terry v. Ziom Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980), Rvher v Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
CROSS REFERENCES
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Civ. P r o c Rule 26.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Chapman v. State, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-An Issue of Admissibility or Credibility? Callister, 1983
UtahL. Rev. 381 (1983).
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials-State v.
Bishop. Prince, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013 (1989).
Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child Molestation: Reforming Utah Law to Permit the Propensity Inference. Cassell and Slrassberg, 1998 Utah L Rev. 145 (1998).
State v Runmasch: Utah's Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Profile Evidence. MundtLarsh, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 641 (1990).
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye . Walden, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839
(1986).
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentncss
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos)
*§j Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits
_• RULE 416. VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC CODE NOT ADMISSIBLE

Evidence that a person was convicted under a provision of Utah Code Annotated Title 41, Chapter 6a, of an infraction or class C misdemeanor is not admissible on the issue of whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongly, or to impeach the person's testimony on those issues.

CREDIT(S)
[Adopted effective March 1, 2006.]
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